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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to analyze the gender wage gap at different points of the wage distribution in Turkey. The gender wage gap is one of the most salient issues that have been investigated in the empirical labor literature. For Turkey, there is a limited number of empirical studies on the topic (Ilkkaracan and Selim, 2007 , Kara, 2006 , Tansel, 2005 , Dayioglu and Tunali, 2004 , Dayioglu and Kasnakoglu, 1997 , but most of these studies examine the average log wage gap between males and females. However, recent studies have shown that the gender gap is not constant across the wage distribution and therefore the average gap provides limited information about women's integration into the labor market. The issue is particularly relevant for Turkey, given the on-going process of accession to the European Union (EU) and the efforts to increase the low -and, surprisingly, declining-female labor force participation.
Recent empirical work for different European and other developed countries has indeed suggested that the gender wage gap becomes more severe at the upper tail of the wage distribution than at the median or at lower tail. For instance Albrecht, Björklund and Vroman (2003) show that, the gender wage gap in Sweden increases throughout the wage distribution with acceleration in the upper tail. They interpret this result as the glass ceiling effect in Sweden. Albrecht, Vuuren and Vroman (2004) consider the gender wage gap for full-time workers in the Netherlands. As the fraction of women working full-time in the Netherlands is quite low, they consider the sample selection problem in their analysis. After sample selection adjustment, they find that a glass ceiling effect is present in the Netherlands. De la Rica, Dolado and Llorens (2008) perform a similar analysis for Spain, showing that for the college/tertiary education group, the gender wage gap is higher at the upper tail than at the lower tail of the wage distribution. On the other hand, they find that for the lower education group, the gap is much higher at the bottom than at the top of the distribution, which they interpret as statistical discrimination by employers, due to low participation rates of women in the lower education group.
Using the European Union Household Panel, Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2007) address the same question for 10 European countries. They show that, on average, women are paid less than men in these countries. Their analyses show the existence of a glass ceiling in over half of the countries considered. For the rest of the countries, they reveal that the gender wage gap is higher at the lower tail than at the upper tail of the wage distribution, which they interpret as a sticky floor effect. Jellal, Nordman and Wolff (2008) investigate the glass ceiling effect in France using a matched worker-firm data and question whether controlling for the firms' characteristics matter for this effect. Although they do not propose any economic hypothesis related to firm characteristics, the relevance of including firm characteristics in wage equations and glass ceiling literature can be considered as a matter for empirical assessment. Introducing firm-related characteristics into the wage equations reduces the gender wage gap at the upper tail of the wage distribution, but the gap still remains much higher at the upper tail than at the lower. In other words, they confirm that, despite the decrease of the gender wage gap at the top of the distribution, the glass ceiling effect in the French labor market remains.
Turkey is an important case in point for this study. Despite the economic and social developments that the country attained in the recent decade, female labor force participation rates are not only quite low relative to the international standards, but have also been decreasing for the past 20 years (World Bank, 2009) . As one of the four pillars of EU Employment Strategy is gender equality, increasing the women who are actively employed has been set as a goal in the Ninth Development Plan of the Turkish Government. On the other hand, improving the labor market conditions for women who are already in the labor market is equally important as increasing the female labor force participation rates.
In Turkey, women always receive lower wages than men (TUSIAD, 2001) . The empirical studies point out that, despite the gender wage gap in the Turkish labor market widening or narrowing depending on education levels, sectors, occupations and the condition of employment, the gap is persistent. This not only has a direct impact on women's participation decision in the labor force; it also affects their status within the labor market. Apparently, if the gender wage gap widens at the top levels of the wage distribution, women's ability to upward advancement and access to male dominated occupations and sectors of the economy would be limited. The consequence is a labor market where "women remain concentrated in the lower levels of the job hierarchy: in the employment market, the company and the job category" (ILO, 2004) .
There is no other study, as far as we know, that investigates the glass ceiling effect for the Turkish labor market. We therefore contribute to this strand of literature by examining the existence of a significant glass ceiling effect in Turkey. Addressing this question requires examining the gender gap at the various points of the wage distribution. For this purpose, Section II gives a brief overview of the Turkish labor market and Section III explains the Structure of Earnings Survey 2006 and provides descriptive statistics on the dataset. Sections IV and V review the quantile regression models and the decomposition technique. Section VI summarizes the findings of quantile regressions and their decomposition. Finally, Section VII concludes.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE TURKISH LABOR MARKET 1
The low labor force participation rates in Turkey present a challenge on her road toward EU accession. As of 2008, Turkey had one of the lowest labor force participation rates among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries -48 percent.
Turkey is still below 6 percentage points as compared to an average of 54 percent in a group of selected comparison Mediterranean countries that includes EU member and non-member countries. This is due to the very low labor force participation rate of women, in Turkey as seen from Figure 1 . The Turkish Government, on her road toward EU accession, implemented a series of national policies aimed at increasing female labor force participation. The 9 th Development Plan has set goals to increase the number of women who are actively employed. Within this framework, the New Labor Act enacted in 2003 examined women's position in the Turkish labor market and a National Action Plan followed. The National Action Plan for Gender Equality (2008) emphasizes that "using women's talents and skills in the labor market not only provides families with more economic independence, but also increases women's self confidence and social respectability". However, despite all these legislation changes that are likely to have a positive effect on female labor force participation, what is puzzling is depicted in Figure 3 Despite these changes that most likely have a positive impact on the female labor force participation rate, its steady decline in the past 20 years is certainly an empirical question. For this reason, the status of women in the Turkish labor market and the barriers to women who are already in the labor force, constitute a central issue and the major motivation of this study.
III. DATA: STRUCTURE OF EARNINGS SURVEY 2006
This study is based on the data given by the The analyses focus on full time employees, comprising 99.3 percent of all employees in the dataset (because the sample size of part time employees is not adequate to achieve reliable statistical inference, we have chosen to consider the more homogeneous group of full-timers).
Only workers with type of employment indefinite and fixed term are considered (that is 99 percent of the full time employees), leaving out the paid stagers and apprentices. Furthermore, the sample is restricted to individuals of working age, between 15 and 64 years old. and 1,011 TRY for males and females respectively. In other words, women earn 98.5 percent of the wages that men earn on average. It can be seen that the monthly basic wage constitutes more than 90 percent of the monthly gross wage for both genders. When basic wages are compared, we observe that women earn on average 2.5 percentage points more than males.
However, in each educational attainment group, the monthly average basic gross wage of females is lower than males'. The higher average female monthly basic wage is the consequence of a composition effect, as women employees are concentrated in the higher education group.
As it is clear from the table, there is a direct relation between educational attainment and wages, with wages increasing with education. The hourly average gross wage shows a similar pattern.
The distribution of employees by economic activity, firm size, occupational group, type of employment and managerial responsibility is displayed in Table 2 For informative purposes, Table 2 includes the distribution of employees with respect to the variable managerial responsibility. 14.7 percent of the employees that are covered in the survey The number of observations that are used in the analyses and the selected descriptive statistics of the relevant variables for this study are presented in Table 3 . Table 3 also displays the 90/10, 90/50 and 50/10 percentile ratios of hourly wages for men and women. The smaller the ratio is the more compression takes place. As the 50/10 percentile ratio is quite lower relative to the 90/50 ratio, it can be said that the more compression took place on the lower tail of the wage distribution in November 2006 for both men and women.
Lastly Figure 4 presents kernel density estimates of the distributions of hourly basic gross wages for females and males, to have a visual summary of the wage distributions. Figure 4 shows the distinction between female' and males' wage distributions. The males' wage distribution peaks relatively high with a lower dispersion around the mode compared to females'. The females'
wage distribution lies within the males' distribution around the mode. Both genders' wage distributions peak at the 25 th and 75 th quantiles and females' wage distribution lies under the males' distribution around these quantiles. The two genders' hourly wage distributions overlap at the upper and lower tail for the interval 2 TRY and 4 TRY. Bassett (1978), seeks to extend the analysis to the whole wage distribution and provides a more complete picture of the covariate effects. In this section, the quantile regression method for modeling the wage distributions and the corresponding decomposition technique is discussed.
For this purpose, let { | = 1,2, … , } be a random sample of (log) wage units in the population of size with the distribution function . For any in the interval (0,1) the th quantile of the (log) wage distribution can be defined as any number ∈ ℝ that fulfills:
(1)
The smallest element of the solution set to the (1) is chosen to avoid the problems that may arise due to the non-uniqueness problem. Then the quantile function is defined as:
and the empirical quantile function is: Koenker and Bassett (1978) proposed an alternative method to this procedure such that the quantile in question is the solution to the following optimization problem:
This new approach to determine empirical quantiles is convenient for an extension to regression settings. For this purpose let = { | = 1,2, … , , = 1,2, … , } be the matrix of covariates of this sample, which includes a constant, a gender dummy, educational attainment level, age, age squared divided by 100 and seniority. Then the th quantile of the (log) wage distribution conditional on the covariates is symbolized as ( | ) and defined by:
where ( ) is a vector of th quantile regression coefficients and ′ is the ℎ row of matrix .
For a given ∈ (0,1), the quantile regression estimator of ( ), ̂( ) is the solution of the following minimization problem (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) :
where ( ) = [( − Ι( < 0)) ] is a check function and Ι(•) is the usual indicator function.
In other words, the th quantile regression estimator of , ̂( ), can be estimated by minimizing the average of asymmetrically weighted absolute errors, with weight on positive errors and ( − 1) on negative errors.
However as the check function is not differentiable at the origin, the minimization problem shown at equation (6) The interpretation of the quantile regression estimator is similar to the least square estimator.
Considering the partial derivative of the th quantile of the (log) wage distribution conditional on the covariates with respect to one of the regressors, say ℎ , ( | )⁄ represents the marginal change at the th quantile of due to a (ceteris paribus) marginal change in the th covariate . The standard errors and confidence intervals for the quantile regression coefficient estimates can be obtained by either using the asymptotic standard error of the estimator or by bootstrapping (Koenker and Hallock, 2000) . The elementary asymptotic theory provided by Koenker and Bassett (1978) is based on the assumption of independently and identically distributed errors ( . . .). In the more realistic case, when the errors are not . . ., estimators can be obtained by various re-sampling methods, namely bootstrapping.
V. DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS USING QUANTILE REGRESSIONS
Following the traditional Oaxaca (1973) decomposition of effects on mean wages, Machado and Mata (2005) proposed a decomposition method combining quantile regressions and the bootstrapping approach. This decomposition method is based on, in the first step, the estimation of the conditional wage distribution by quantile regressions and in the second, the estimation of the marginal density functions of wages that is consistent with the conditional distribution defined by equation (6). For this purpose, Machado and Mata (2005) employed the integral theorem from elementary statistics: if is a uniform random variable on [0,1], then −1 ( ) has the distribution of . Thus if 1 , 2 , … , are randomly drawn from a uniform (0,1) distribution, the estimates of the conditional quantiles at a given , { ′̂( )} =1 will constitute a random sample from the estimated conditional distribution of at given . Then, to get a sample from the marginal, rather than keeping fixed, a random sample of the covariates can be drawn from the population. Formally, the steps of this procedure can be summarized as:
1. Generate a random sample of size m from a [0,1]: 1 , 2 , … , .
2. For the data set and each { } =1 estimate ( | ) to get estimates of quantile regression coefficients ̂( ), = 1,2, … , .
3. Generate a random sample of size with replacement from the covariates, denoted by
4. Finally {̃=̃′̂( )} =1 is a random sample of size from the desired distribution.
In particular we are interested in two types of counterfactual wage distribution, males' and females'. In other words, to reveal the gender wage gap, we want to simulate the marginal wage distribution that would have prevailed for females if all covariates had been distributed as males'. In this case the above procedure is run as: The step 5 can be repeated to generate the second counterfactual density by simply reversing the roles of females and males. This way, two counterfactual densities are obtained: (1) the female log wage density that would arise if women were given men's characteristics but having their own wages and (2) the density that would arise if women retained their own characteristics but were paid like their male counterparts (Albrecht, et al., 2003) .
Then the decomposition of the difference between quantiles of the male and female wage distribution is given by:
where the first component is the contribution of the covariates and the second component is the contribution of the coefficients to the difference between the th quantile of the male wage distribution and the th quantile of the female wage distribution.
VI. RESULTS FROM QUANTILE REGRESSION AND DECOMPOSITION

ANALYSIS
In this section the results from quantile regression estimates and the decomposition of observed gender wage gaps are presented. Firstly, following Albrecht et al. (2003) , for various specifications, a series of quantile regression estimations is performed to explore the gender gap that remains unexplained at the various quantiles of the wage distribution by using the pooled dataset of males and females. Secondly, the quantile regressions for females and males are estimated separately and the difference between returns of individual and firm characteristics at the various points in female and male wage distributions is presented. Lastly, the decomposition results of the difference between the male and female wage distribution is displayed.
Pooled Quantile Regression Results with Gender Dummies
In this part of the analyses, a series of quantile regressions are estimated using the total male and female mixed sample. The coefficient estimates and the standard errors of the gender dummy in each specification for the fifth, tenth, twenty-fifth, fiftieth, seventy-fifth, ninetieth and ninety-fifth percentiles are presented in Table 4 present the gender gap that remains unexplained at the various quantiles of the wage distribution after controlling for the covariates 4 Among the commercial software packages, Stata provides basic functionalities to estimate the quantile regression estimators and their standard errors. The command qreg provides the asymptotic standard errors based on the assumption of . . . errors. In particular, the reported standard errors in this study are based on the pair wise bootstrapping where pairs, ( , ) = 1,2, … , , are randomly drawn from the original sample with replacement.
As the observations of our analyses come from a simple random stratified sampling method, the pair wise bootstrapping approach, which is based on the independently but not identically distributed setting, is consistent. For this purpose, the command for simultaneous quantile regressions sqreg is used and the re-sampling procedure is repeated 100 times, to yield a sample whose covariance matrix is a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of the original estimator.
in each specification. A negative coefficient implies that a negative unexplained gender gap remains even after the labor market characteristics in the model are controlled for. The lower the coefficient is, the more disadvantageous the women are. On the other hand, expanding the controls from one model to another, aims at exploring the change in the gender dummy coefficient from the simplest model to the expanded model in various quantiles.
The first specification named as observed gender gap is the basic model where log hourly wage is regressed on the gender dummy. Basic control variables include the individual specific characteristics, such as age, age square divided by 100, seniority and educational attainment. When the rows of the Table 4 are compared, it can be seen that expanding the model has an impact on the gender dummy coefficient. Firstly, the comparison of second and third rows of the Table 4 suggests that adding employment type to the model has no clear impact on the gender gap at the lower quantiles. At the upper tail of the wage distribution, the gender gap slightly increases after adding employment type as a control variable. Secondly, the pair wise comparison of the third and fourth models in Table 4 shows that, when economic activity is controlled for, the gender wage gap at the upper tail of the wage distribution (90 th and 95 th quantiles) increases. Conversely, including economic activity as an explanatory variable decreases the gap at the median and at the 75 th quantile. Moreover, adding occupation as a control variable increases the gender wage gap, as revealed by the pair wise comparison of models four and five at each quantile in which this coefficient is significant. On the other hand, the OLS coefficient suggests that there is no effect of controlling for employment type and occupation at the mean of the wage distribution. The fifth and sixth models comparison suggest that controlling for the firm characteristics increases the gap at the bottom and the median, as well as the mean, while decreasing it at the top of the wage distribution. Table 4 is that the gender dummy coefficient is decreasing in each model, except the first specification, as the quantile increases. In other words, the gender wage gap that remains unexplained is higher in the upper tail of the wage distribution than at the median and the lower tail. In the first specification, where none of the controls are taken into account, women seem to be positively discriminated in the upper tail. (1) Observed gender gap 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,010 ** -0,018 ** 0,002 0,074 *** -0,002 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,004) (0,008) (0,007) (0,008) (0,003)
One of the striking features of the results in
(2) Gender gap with basic control variables -0,000 -0,000 -0,009 *** -0,024 *** -0,058 *** -0,077 *** -0,067 *** -0,051 *** (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007) (0,002)
(3) Gender gap with extended control variables -0,000 -0,000 -0,010 *** -0,023 *** -0,058 *** -0,078 *** -0,069 *** -0,051 *** (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,006) (0,002) (4) Gender gap with extended control variables and sector -0,000 -0,001 * -0,009 *** -0,019 *** -0,056 *** -0,082 *** -0,082 *** -0,055 *** (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007) (0,002) (5) Gender gap with extended control variables, sector and occupation -0,000 -0,002 *** -0,010 *** -0,023 *** -0,058 *** -0,095 *** -0,096 *** -0,055 *** (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007) (0,002) (6) Gender gap with extended control variables, sector, occupation and firm characteristics -0,006 *** -0,007 *** -0,014 *** -0,024 *** -0,043 *** -0,062 *** -0,075 *** -0,047 *** (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,005) (0,002) However, when we start to control for relevant labor market characteristics, this result is reversed, already after the basic controls (second row of Table 4 ). This effect, as described in Section III, is a consequence of the composition of employees. As women are concentrated in the higher education groups, the observed raw gender gap suggests that women are positively discriminated at the upper tail of the wage distribution.
Another salient feature of the results displayed in Table 4 is the insignificance of the gender dummy coefficient for the fifth percentile in most of the models, and for the tenth in some, except the one that controls for the firm characteristics (6 th row of Table 4 ). This implies that there is no significant evidence for a gender wage gap at the lowest quantile of the wage distribution when firm characteristics are not controlled for. Despite the gender dummy not being significant at the 5 th quantile in any model, the coefficient turns significant already from the 25 th quantile onwards. When the firm characteristics are added to the controls, interestingly, the gender wage gap increases in the lower quantiles, namely, 5 th , 10 th and 25 th while it is reduced in absolute terms in higher, 90 th and 95 th , quantiles. Considering the significant effect of the firm characteristics to the marginal effect of gender dummy on log wage distribution, in the further steps of the analyses the last specification in Table 4 is preferred. In so doing, we are able to control observed firm specific factors, which have a significant effect on the magnitude of the gender wage gap along the wage distribution.
Lastly, the equality of the gender dummy coefficients is tested for various combinations of quantile pairs in each model presented in table 4. In all specifications, the equality of the seven gender dummy coefficients is rejected at one percent significance level. Furthermore, in all models, except the last two, the gender dummy coefficient at the 5 th -10 th and 90 th -95 th quantile pairs are not statistically different, at the 1% significance level. The difference between gender dummy coefficients at the 90 th and 95 th quantiles in the fifth model is not statistically significant, while in the sixth specification this difference is not statistically significant only at the 5 th and 10 th quantiles.
On the other hand, the estimated OLS coefficient for gender dummy is between -4.7% and -5.5% if we consider all the specifications from the second to the sixth. For each specification this coefficient is close to the one that is estimated from the 75 th quantile regression. However, the coefficients at the lowest and highest quantiles, even at the median, are quite different than the OLS estimates. In other words, OLS estimates are not sufficient to capture the marginal effect of the gender dummy on log hourly wages at the lower and the upper tails of the wage distribution, irrespective to the specification.
The complete set of quantile regression and OLS estimates of the coefficients for regression on the extended control variables, sector, and occupation as well as firm characteristics is displayed in Table 5 5 . As Table 5 presents, the effects of age and age square on log hourly wages are constant at the 5 th , 10 th and 50 th quantile, whereas it increases at the upper tail of the distribution.
The marginal effect of seniority on wages is 0.7 % at the 5 th quantile and 10 th quantiles. This effect increases to around 3 % at the upper tail of the wage distribution. At each quantile, estimated returns to education increase with the level of education. The same applies for the OLS estimation results. For instance, the wage of an employee who completed the primary education or attended a secondary school is 0.7% higher than for a worker who either attended primary school or no school, at the 5 th quantile, controlling for age, gender, seniority, education, occupation and sector as well as firm characteristics. Whereas this difference is 5.4 percentage points between a university graduate and a worker who either attended primary school or no school. Similarly, at the 95 th quantile this difference turns to be 9.8% for an employee who completed the primary education or attended a secondary school and 93.4% for a university graduate. Then again, at each education level, estimated returns to education are similar for the lower quantiles, while it starts to increase at the median noticeably and continue to increase as we move up the wage distribution.
The coefficient of the fixed term employment is -0.024 at the 5 th quantile while it is -0.001 at the median and -0.063 at the highest quantile. This implies that employees working with a fixed term contract are earning 2.4 percentage points less than the ones who are working with an indefinite contract at the 5 th quantile, controlling for age, seniority, education, occupation and sector as well as firm characteristics. The fixed term penalty decreases through the wage distribution up to median but start to increase after it as we move up to the upper tail of the wage distribution.
Moreover at each quantile, there is a pay advantage of workers who work in large workplaces.
Accordingly, of two workers with the same gender, age, seniority, level of education, type of contract, working in the same sector and occupation, and both covered with the collective labor agreement, the one in the largest workplace earns 10.6% more than the one in a workplace with less than 50 employees at the 5 th quantile. This gap is 32.6% at the median and 43.6% at the highest quantile. 5th  10th  25th  50th  75th  90th  95th  mean Female -0,006 *** -0,007 *** -0,014 *** -0,024 *** -0,043 *** -0,062 *** -0,075 *** -0,047 *** (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,005) (0,002) Age 0,002 *** -0,000 -0,001 *** 0,003 *** 0,011 *** 0,032 *** 0,046 *** 0,023 *** (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) Age 2 /100 -0,001 ** 0,001 *** 0,002 *** -0,002 *** -0,010 *** -0,028 *** -0,042 *** -0,022 *** (0,001) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003) (0,001) Seniority 0,007 *** 0,007 *** 0,013 *** 0,025 *** 0,034 *** 0,033 *** 0,032 *** 0,026 *** (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) Primary education and secondary school 0,007 *** 0,006 *** 0,011 *** 0,018 *** 0,042 *** 0,085 *** 0,098 *** 0,049 *** (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,007) (0,002)
High school 0,014 *** 0,010 *** 0,016 *** 0,026 *** 0,067 *** 0,154 *** 0,207 *** 0,084 *** (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,006) (0,002)
Vocational high school 0,035 *** 0,032 *** 0,038 *** 0,071 *** 0,186 *** 0,276 *** 0,336 *** 0,173 *** (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,005) (0,008) (0,003)
Higher education 0,054 *** 0,056 *** 0,078 *** 0,342 *** 0,617 *** 0,823 *** 0,934 *** 0,447 *** (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,006) (0,006) (0,010) (0,011) (0,003)
Fixed term employment -0,024 *** -0,008 *** -0,002 -0,001 -0,016 *** -0,051 *** -0,063 *** -0,029 *** (0,006) (0,002) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003) (0,006) (0,009) (0,004) 50-249 employees 0,040 *** 0,022 *** 0,029 *** 0,045 *** 0,164 *** 0,234 *** 0,235 *** 0,151 *** (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,005) (0,006) (0,002) 250-499 employees 0,067 *** 0,052 *** 0,058 *** 0,148 *** 0,307 *** 0,344 *** 0,311 *** 0,256 *** (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,004) (0,005) (0,009) (0,003) 500-999 employees 0,085 *** 0,066 *** 0,074 *** 0,197 *** 0,344 *** 0,358 *** 0,326 *** 0,290 *** (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,004) (0,005) (0,006) (0,008) (0,003) 1000+ employees 0,106 *** 0,089 *** 0,209 *** 0,326 *** 0,440 *** 0,461 *** 0,436 ** 0,376 *** (0,002) (0,001) (0,004) (0,004) (0,006) (0,007) (0,008) (0,003)
Collective agreement 0,124 *** 0,227 *** 0,418 *** 0,384 *** 0,270 *** 0,229 *** 0,210 *** 0,258 *** (0,003) (0,005) (0,004) (0,004) (0,005) (0,006) (0,007) (0,003) Constant 0,866 *** 0,936 *** 1,033 *** 1,282 *** 1,483 *** 1,391 *** 1,300 *** 0,901 *** (0,009) (0,005) (0,006) (0,011) (0,014) (0,026) (0,035) (0,012) Mining and quarrying, 2. Manufacturing , 3. Electricity, gas and water supply, 4. Construction, 5. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods, 6. Hotels and restaurants, 7. Transport, storage and communication, 8. Financial intermediation, 9. Real estate, renting and business activities, 10. Education, 11. Health and social work, 12. Other community, social 
Number of observations
and personal service activities
If a similar analysis is performed for the coefficient estimate of the coverage of the workplace under collective labor agreement, there is a pay advantage for the workers who are working in a workplace that is under the collective labor agreement. The highest is at 25 th quantile of the wage distribution with 41.8% difference and second at the median with 38.4%. The lowest difference exists at the bottom and the top of the difference, 12.4% and 21% at the 5 th and 95 th quantiles, respectively.
Quantile Regression Results by Gender
In the analyses, the quantile regressions are estimated separately for females and males to examine if a difference between the returns to individual and firm characteristics for women and men exists at the various points of their respective wage distributions. Table 6 displays the estimated coefficients of the extended control variables, such as age, age squared, seniority, education and type of contract, as well as the firm characteristics, by the quantile log wage regressions separately for males and females at various quantiles.
For both genders, the coefficients on age are higher at the upper tail of the wage distribution than the lower tail and the median while for women these coefficients are higher than for men at all the quantiles of the wage distribution. An additional year of seniority is associated with a similar increase in pay for males and females at the lower tail of the wage distribution, at the median and at the 75 th quantile. However at the upper tail of the distribution there is a pay advantage of women who have an additional year of seniority than men around 0.4% at the 90 th quantile and 0.7% at the 95 th quantile. On the other hand women get a higher return to education than men at all the quantiles for the primary education level. The same applies for the high school graduates. In contrast, among vocational high school and university graduates, men realize higher return to education than women at the lower tail and the median of the wage distribution. For vocational high school graduates at the 75 th quantile, for the higher education level at the 95 th quantile women start to get a bigger payoff than men.
The coefficient of the fixed term employment is -0.016 and -0.044 at the 5 th quantile while it is -0.049 and -0.054 at the 90 th quantile for men and women respectively. This implies that female employees that are working with a fixed term contract are earning 0.5% less than their male counterparts at the 90 th quantile. This gap is even higher at the lower quantiles, with 2.8% at the 5 th quantile. In terms of firm characteristics, first, women have a pay penalty in large firms with more than 500 employees. In the small and medium size firms, at the lower tail of the wage distribution men have a pay penalty, but men start to get a bigger payoff than women at the small size firms starting from the 75 th quantile and at firms with 250-499 employees starting from the median. Second, after controlling for the age, seniority, level of education, type of contract, sector and occupation, and size of the workplace, male employees have a pay advantage than women in workplaces those covered under collective bargaining agreements, except the 75 th quantile at which women have an advantage of 0.9%.
The OLS estimates of the coefficients are reported in the last two columns of Table 6 . It is clear that, OLS is not adequate to analyze these patterns of differences between the returns of individual and firm characteristics at the various points of female and male wage distributions.
Decomposition Results for Gender Wage Gap Using Quantile Regressions
So far we have dealt with the quantile regression estimates but now we turn our attention to the decomposition of the observed gender gap into two components: one due to the characteristics and the other to the coefficients 6 . Given the size of the dataset and the computational limitations, it was not feasible to perform the decomposition on the whole sample. Therefore, in this part of the analysis a random sample of the data consisting of 20% of the whole data set is used.
For decomposition analyses, first, the counterfactual densities for several alternative specifications are constructed assuming that women have the male labor market characteristics but are rewarded for these characteristics as female employees. Table 7 shows the counterfactual gap that is the gap between male log wage density and the counterfactual density for several alternative specifications presented in the previous section. The first row of the Table 7 gives the observed gender gap at the various quantiles of the wage distribution that is identical to the one in Table 4 . The counterfactual gender gaps in Table 7 are the gaps between male log wage densities and the counterfactual densities constructed by estimating the betas using only women and then assuming that women have the male distribution of labor market characteristics. 6 The decomposition of differences in wage distributions is applied using the Stata command rqdeco (See Melly, 2007) . Melly (2006) shows that this procedure is numerically identical to the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition method when the number of simulations used in Machado and Mata procedure goes to infinity. In the decomposition procedure of our study, rather than taking random draws from (0,1) and estimating quantile regression coefficients, the decomposition is performed for the 99 percentile differences in wages between men and women. 100 quantile regressions are estimated in the first step and the standard errors for the counterfactual densities are obtained by repeating the procedure 100 times.
The first row of Table 7 suggests that there is no clear evidence of an observed gender gap at the lower tail of the wage distribution. Moreover at the upper tail of the distribution women have a pay advantage. However the counterfactual gaps for several alternative specifications suggest the reverse. In most of the models, the counterfactual gap is positive at the lower quantiles while this turns negative already from the 25 th quantile onwards. For the last specification, presented in the last row of Table 7 , the counterfactual gap is negative at all the quantiles of the wage distribution.
This implies, despite women were given men's characteristics but having their own wages, they would earn less than their male counterparts at the upper tail of the wage distribution. Moreover, the counterfactual gap is rising throughout the wage distribution irrespective to the specification.
The results reported in Table 7 can be compared with the gender dummy coefficients in Table 4 .
The gender dummy coefficients in Table 4 that give the gender gap controlling for various labor market characteristics but assume that return to these characteristics are the same for males and females. The common feature of Table 4 and Table 7 is the rise of the gap throughout the wage distribution. However, the main difference between the two tables is the dispersion of the gender gap throughout the wage distribution in each specification. The distinction of gender gap between the lower and the higher quantiles is sharper in Table 7 than in Table 4 . A similar pattern is observed regardless of the specification. For instance, the last row of Table 4 suggests that, when age, seniority, education, employment type, occupation and sector as well as the firm (1) Observed gender gap 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,010 -0,018 0,002 0,074
(2) Counterfactual gap using basic control variables 0,002 0,005 -0,004 -0,054 -0,106 -0,105 -0,109
(3) Counterfactual gap using extended control variables 0,003 0,006 -0,004 -0,053 -0,107 -0,106 -0,110 (4) Counterfactual gap using extended control variables and sector -0,001 0,002 -0,004 -0,042 -0,106 -0,128 -0,144 (5) Counterfactual gap using extended control variables, sector and occupation 0,000 0,003 -0,004 -0,045 -0,120 -0,140 -0,152 (6) Counterfactual gap using extended control variables, sector, occupation and firm characteristics -0,010 -0,012 -0,010 -0,033 -0,097 -0,099 -0,107 characteristics are controlled for, the gender gap is 0.6% at the 5 th quantile while it is 7.5% at the 95 th quantile. But Table 7 presents after controlling for all these variables the gender gap accounts for 1% at the bottom whereas 10.7% at the top quantile. For a more detailed understanding of the role of returns to the worker attributes shaping the gender wage gap, for the last specification in Table 7 , the observed gender gap and two alternative counterfactual gaps are reported in Table   8 . Additionally, Table 8 presents the bootstrapped standard errors of these gaps. The first counterfactual gender gap and the observed gender gap that is reported in Table 8 are identical with the last and the first row of Table 7 , respectively. The second counterfactual gap is based on the density that would arise if women employees retained their own characteristics but were paid like their male counterparts. Both of the counterfactual gaps are negative and statistically significant at all the quantiles of the wage distribution. Figure 5 presents a visual display of these counterfactual gaps within the 95 percent confidence interval. Observed gender gap 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,010 -0,018 0,002 0,074 (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,004) (0,008) (0,007) (0,008) I. Counterfactual gap ̃(̂−̂) -0,010 -0,012 -0,010 -0,033 -0,097 -0,099 -0,107 (0,004) (0,003) (0,002) (0,005) (0,007) (0,012) (0,015) II. Counterfactual gap ̃(̂−̂) -0,006 -0,007 -0,010 -0,055 -0,090 -0,105 -0,116 (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,005) (0,007) (0,010) Source: TUIK, Structure of Earnings Survey, 2006. Notes: First counterfactual density is constructed assuming that women have the characteristics of male employees and returns to these characteristics of female employees and the second assuming that men have the characteristics of female employees and returns to these characteristics of male employees using a random sample of the data consisting of 20% of the data. Standard errors in parenthesis are obtained by bootstrapping the results 100 times. The first counterfactual gap in Table 8 shows that, even if, women were given men's characteristics but had their own returns on these characteristics, there would be a pay penalty for women.
Similarly, the second counterfactual density in Table 8 suggests that keeping their own labor market characteristics, if women would be rewarded like their male counterparts they would earn more at all the quantiles of the wage distribution. Therefore the gender gap at the top of the distribution is due to the differences in rewards between women and men for their labor market characteristics, rather than the differences in these characteristics. This is more apparent in Figure   6 , where the decomposition results for the model that controls for age, seniority, education, employment type, occupation and sector, as well as the firm characteristics as a function of the percentiles is plotted. As seen in Figure 6 , the effects of coefficients are always below the observed gender gap while the effects of characteristics are always above. Furthermore this effect is rising throughout the wage distribution, with a sharp distinction as we move from the lower tail to the upper tail, which indicates the existence of a glass ceiling in the Turkish labor market. Despite the fact that the characteristics have an opposite effect, as the effects of coefficients at all points of the wage distribution pull down the observed gender gap, the glass ceiling effect is not apparent in the raw gender gap. 
VII. CONCLUSION
This study provides evidence on the integration of women into the Turkish labor market and contributes to the literature on the gender pay gap at different points of the wage distribution.
Similarities and contrasts between the experience of Turkey and that of other countries covered in the previous literature can be highlighted.
First of all, this study reveals the existence of a significant glass ceiling effect in the Turkish labor market. These results are comparable to the findings of several previous studies that consider the glass ceiling effect in European countries (Albrecht et al., 2003; Jellal et al. 2008) . The glass ceiling effect in the Turkish labor market is mostly due to differences in rewards between women and men for their labor market characteristics, rather than to the differences in these characteristics at the top of the distribution, which is very much in line with the findings of previous studies.
Secondly, and as opposed to most of the previous literature, the glass ceiling effect in Turkey is not apparent in the observed raw gender gap. As far as we know, this is not a common phenomenon. The glass ceiling effect is not observed in the raw gap and is revealed only by the regression and decomposition analyses due to a composition effect -in Turkey, women employees are concentrated in the higher education group.
Then again, this study is limited by the constraints of the data set. The lack of information about household composition of the employees that is very likely to affect women's labor force participation decision, as well as their occupation and sector choice, prevents this study from having an additional discussion on selection issues. Therefore, the link between the results of this study and "the puzzle of low female labor force participation" in Turkey, and the cross-country lessons to understand this link are still remaining as an issue for future research. Female -0,000 -0,000 -0,009 *** -0,024 *** -0,058 *** -0,077 *** -0,067 *** -0,051 *** Pseudo-R 2 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,23 0,34 0,34 0,33 0,40 Source: TUIK, Structure of Earnings Survey, 2006. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. For quantile regressions bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are reported. *, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively Female -0,000 -0,000 -0,010 *** -0,023 *** -0,058 *** -0,078 *** -0,069 *** -0,051 *** Female -0,000 -0,001 * -0,009 *** -0,019 *** -0,056 *** -0,082 *** -0,082 *** -0,055 *** 302 714  302 714  302 714  302 714  302 714  302 714  302 714  302 714 Pseudo-R 2 0,03 0,03 0,08 0,26 0,36 0,36 0,35 0,44 Source: TUIK, Structure of Earnings Survey, 2006. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. For quantile regressions bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are reported. *, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively 1. The regressions include 12 economic activity (NACE Rev. 1.1) dummies: 1. Mining and quarrying, 2. Manufacturing , 3. Electricity, gas and water supply, 4. Construction, 5. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods, 6. Hotels and restaurants, 7. Transport, storage and communication, 8. Financial intermediation, 9. Real estate, renting and business activities, 10. Education, 11. Health and social work, 12. Other community, social and personal service activities Female -0,000 -0,002 *** -0,010 *** -0,023 *** -0,058 *** -0,095 *** -0,096 *** -0,055 ***
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